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ABSTRACT
This article examines the emergence of solidarity from interactions between
professionals competing for collaboration. Research on multiplex collaboration
networkshas shown that economic exchange canelicit solidaritywhenmediated
by trust but did not consider the effect of competition. To fill this gap, we built an
agent-based model that simulates the evolution of a multiplex network of
collaboration, trust, and support expectations. Simulations show that while
resource heterogeneity is key for collaboration, competition for attractive colla-
boration partners penalizes low-resource professionals, who are less connected
and highly segregated. Heterogeneous resource distribution can trigger segre-
gation because of preferential selection of resourceful peers and reciprocity.
Interestingly, we also found that low-resource professionals can reduce their
marginalization by building in-group mutual support expectations.
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1. Introduction
Examining the emergence of solidarity when economic agents have competitive incentives to collaborate
is relevant to understand the complex interplay of economic and social factors in socio-economic
exchanges (see Coleman, 1990; Granovetter, 2017). Moreover, studying the conditions that make the
development of solidarity possible between economic agents whose collaboration is neither institution-
ally nor organizationally enforced is relevant to understand how solidarity that goes beyond mere
economic collaboration can emerge from the tension between cooperation and competition.
Following Lindenberg (1998), understanding the development of solidarity requires to consider
the formation of the behavioral correlates of solidarity, such as expectations of receiving support
from others (see also Komter, 2001; Lindenberg, Fetchenhauer, Flache, & Buunk, 2006). To which
extent in a given situation economic agents expect social support from each other can be considered
as a key prerequisite for solidary behavior. Therefore, in this article we studied the emergence of ties
of mutual support expectations in an economic context.
Previous research has shown that independent professionals collaborating for business-related pur-
poses can develop expectations of receiving support from each other (Bianchi, Casnici, & Squazzoni,
2018) provided that the structure of their collaborations makes learning about each other’s trustworthi-
ness possible in risky business-related situations (Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2009).
However, this mechanism can be sensitive to the level of competition characterizing business
contexts. Considering that collaboration is often motivated by one’s desire to access resources
controlled by others (Coleman, 1990), professionals might strive to collaborate with the most
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attractive partners, who control a higher level of resources (e.g., certain skills or contacts). Given that
these resources are often unequally distributed either in a group or an organization (Blau, 1977;
Bourgeois & Friedkin, 2001; Yamaguchi, 1996), it can be expected that centralized collaboration
networks emerge (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983; Emerson,
1972; Schaefer, 2007), which could eventually affect the development of trust. On the one hand,
centralization of collaboration relations among resourceful individuals could suppress expectations
of support between agents with unequal resource levels. On the other hand, theoretical modeling
work has suggested that professionals with lower resource levels could be more prone to expect and
seek support because of their higher level of “neediness” compared to resourceful professionals
(Flache & Hegselmann, 1999a, 1999b).
In this study, we examined the effect of these counterbalancing social forces on the formation of
mutual support expectations between professionals who have unequal resources and compete for
resourceful collaboration partners. To do so, we used a stochastic actor-oriented model for multiplex
network dynamics (Snijders, 1996, 2017; Snijders, Lomi, & Torló, 2013) as an agent-based model (Macy
& Flache, 2009; Bianchi & Squazzoni, 2015; see also Snijders & Steglich, 2015; Stadtfeld, 2018; Stadtfeld,
Takács, & Vörös, 2019). This permitted us to simulate the evolution of a multiplex network of
collaboration, trust and expectations of support, while controlling various factors and manipulating
relevant parameters to generate new theoretical hypotheses about the conditions under which socio-
economic exchanges can be expected to give rise to solidarity. By manipulating resource distribution and
agents’ neediness for support, we explored artificial scenarios in which the counterbalancing forces of
preferential selection of resourceful partners and emergence of support driven by collaboration, trust and
reciprocity could be thoroughly examined.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our research background. Section 3
illustrates the model, while Section 4 presents model specification and simulation design. Finally, Section 5
shows simulation results, while Section 6 discusses implications and limitations of our study.
2. Research background
Although the effect of social network structures on economic behavior has been studied extensively
in sociology (see Granovetter, 2017), examining the opposite direction, i.e., how economic exchange
relationships between individuals can generate solidarity, has attracted less attention (Bianchi et al.,
2018; Kuwabara, 2011; Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2008; Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007). However, this
is key not only to understand the interplay of social and economic exchange but also to examine
important network and organizational processes, as structural interaction constraints, organizational
settings and incentives can influence the interplay of economic and social motivations, thereby
magnifying or inhibiting collaboration.
Experimental research in social psychology has studied the link between economic exchange and
solidarity, by focusing mainly on the ‘sentiments’ of solidarity developing between exchange partners
(Homans, 1950; see also Fararo & Doreian, 1998). On the one hand, some studies have found that
successful economic exchanges in equal-power networks tend to promote coordination of common
interests and elicit shared positive emotions, with partners conferring expressive value to their relation-
ship (Lawler, 2001; Lawler et al., 2008; see also Thye, Yoon, & Lawler, 2002). On the other hand, studies
on unequal-power networks have found that this link depends on the generation of trust between
partners. In turn, trust is affected by the presence of agreements protecting partners from mutually
exploiting each other. These agreements would not allow partners to learn each other’s trustworthiness,
which would prevent partners to develop trust relationships and eventually hinder the emergence of
solidarity (Molm et al., 2007; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000; Molm, 2003; see also, 2010).
Further research suggested amore context-specific view of the link between economic exchange, trust,
and solidarity. Barrera (2007) has shown that subjects who are engaged in repeated economic exchanges
can develop trust in each other, provided that none of them has a structural advantage over the other.
A positive effect of economic exchange on trust was also found by Molm et al. (2009), who reported
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results of exchange interactions with loose “non-binding” agreements, which allowed partners to
effectively prove their trustworthiness to each other. However, the success of these exchanges was
often undermined by opportunistic behavior, thereby generating a “fragile” form of trust. In a similar
vein, Kuwabara (2011) found that the effect of economic exchange on trust and solidarity depended on
partners’ perception of risk-taking, conflict and expressive value.
Nevertheless, social psychological research has provided evidence of a link between trust and
sentiments of solidarity (Molm et al., 2007). This suggests that a key condition for solidarity to
develop from an economic exchange is that partners can learn about each other’s trustworthiness in
risky exchanges (Kuwabara, 2011; Molm et al., 2009).
While experimental research has mainly studied sentiment, other scholars have focused more
on behavioral aspects of solidarity (Homans, 1950; Hechter, 1987; Lindenberg, 1998; see also
Fararo & Doreian, 1998). In particular, Lindenberg (1998) has identified the following five patterns
of ‘solidary behavior’ that define the level of solidarity observable in a social group: cooperation in
social dilemmas, fairness in resource sharing, support (i.e., provision of costly help) to others in
need, avoiding breach temptations, and considerateness in mishap situations (see also Lindenberg
et al., 2006). By focusing on support as an instance of ‘solidary behavior’, Bianchi et al. (2018)
tested the hypothesis that solidarity can emerge within economic exchanges via trust by empiri-
cally observing a network of independent professionals sharing a coworking space. They measured
economic exchanges among subjects as professional collaboration networks. Subjects were found
to engage in frequent informal professional collaborations with each other to outsource some tasks
to other professionals in order to manage scheduling and quality in risky and volatile markets.
These collaborations consisted of informal, loosely-binding agreements. They were similar to risky
economic exchanges where trust could emerge once partners eventually resisted their temptation
to exploit cheating opportunities. By analyzing the subjects’ multiplex relationships of collabora-
tion, trust, and support, the study found no evidence of a direct association of collaboration and
support. Instead, it was found that subjects disproportionately expected to receive support from
those professionals whom they trusted, which in turn was associated to previous successful
collaborations. In sum, expected solidary behavior from economic exchange partners was
mediated by the generation of trust.
It is worth noting that professional collaborations have been extensively studied by empirical
research in a variety of contexts (e.g. Andersen, 2013). Studies on corporate management (e.g.
Mizruchi, 2004; Westphal & Milton, 2000), scientific research (e.g. Moody, 2004; Newman, 2001),
and creative production (e.g. Uzzi & Spiro, 2005) suggested that resource heterogeneity is one of
the main drivers of collaboration, by enabling functional complementarity. Moreover, studies on
multiplex networks have shown that heterophily in collaboration networks often co-occurs with
similarity on certain attributes of individuals (e.g., Casciaro & Lobo, 2008; see also Blau, 1974).
However, to the best of our knowledge, the effect of heterogeneity either on professional
collaboration and other co-occurring relationships, such as trust or social support, has been less
studied. It is reasonable to expect that resource heterogeneity – e.g., interpersonal differences in
advanced skills or competencies – could induce professionals to compete for collaboration with
partners controlling these resources (Blau, 1964, 1977; Coleman, 1990). This would possibly cause
the emergence of centralized collaboration network structures with more resourceful professionals
occupying the most central positions (Bourgeois & Friedkin, 2001; Cook & Emerson, 1978; Cook
et al., 1983; Emerson, 1972; Patton & Willer, 1990; Schaefer, 2007).
While network centrality has been shown to yield positive effects on individual performance (e.g.,
Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson, 1997; Brass, 1981), more recent research has pointed to the possible
detrimental effects of resource centralization on team performance (Mora-Cantallops & Sicilia,
2019). Given that successful economic exchange can breed trust and support expectations, it can
be expected that centralization in collaboration networks could concentrate on emergent solidarity
among more resourceful professionals (see also Molm, 1994).
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Here, it is important to note that simulation studies have suggested that resource heterogeneity
could also positively affect the emergence of social support networks as long as resourceful agents are
sufficiently altruistic to seek out those partners who could benefit the most from receiving support.
In a theoretical work, Flache and Hegselmann (1999a) have shown that individuals with hetero-
geneous resources and partially altruistic preferences can develop efficient support exchange net-
works because their different endowments are inversely related to differences in “neediness” – i.e., the
need for social support. Being less capable of providing social support, low-resource agents are more
needy than high-resource ones. This would cause an efficient exchange of support within the
network to develop.
However, assuming that professionals in business contexts do not primarily aim to exchange
support out of altruistic preferences, but compete with each other for collaboration partners with
specific skills, resource heterogeneity could have a double-edged effect on the formation of social
support expectations. On the one hand, it can be expected that everyone would seek to establish
collaboration relationships with resourceful partners, thereby causing the emergence of
a centralized collaboration network. This would in turn lead trust to cluster between core partners
in the collaboration network with the same partners who would disproportionately expect support
from each other rather than from less trusted professionals. On the other hand, low-resource
professionals would be constrained in the peripheral regions of the collaboration network (see,
e.g., Flache & Hegselmann, 1999b). This would limit their opportunities to form trust ties and
expectations of support.
In order to test the theoretical consistency of our expectations, we formulated two propositions, as
follows.
Proposition 1a Competition for high-resource partners in a collaboration network with unequal
resource distribution generates a support expectation network with lower connectivity com-
pared to a situation in which there is no competition.
Proposition 1b Competition for high-resource partners in a collaboration network with unequal
resource distribution generates a support expectation network with segregation between high-
resource and low-resource agents.
However, considering that an unequal resource distribution implies a negative correlation
between resources and neediness, it is also possible that the negative effect of competition could
be counterbalanced. This will happen when low-resource agents who are excluded from exchanges
with resourceful agents eventually turn to each other to establish mutual support relations.
This led us to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Heterogeneous neediness negatively correlated with resources compensates for
the exclusion of low-resource agents otherwise generated by competition and unequal resource
distribution.
3. The model
In order to test that our propositions follow consistently from a set of fundamental behavioral
assumptions, we developed an agent-based model (ABM) which reproduced previous findings
about expectations of social support from collaboration relationships via trust (Bianchi et al.,
2018). We then manipulated the level of agents’ resources and neediness in idealized simulation
scenarios.
Following Flache and Stark (2009), our ABM was based on a stochastic actor-oriented model
(SAOM) for multiplex network dynamics (Snijders, 1996, 2017; Snijders et al., 2013). This allowed us
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to model tie formation, maintenance, and disruption by considering the complex interdependencies
between agent preferences for partners’ attributes (e.g., collaboration ties with high-resource nodes)
and endogenous structural processes (e.g., a tendency to reciprocate trust ties). Note that SAOMs are
a combination of theoretical and statistical models (Snijders & Steglich, 2015) and are mainly used
for statistical modeling of longitudinal network panel data and their co-evolution with node
attributes. This is to assess the effect of certain network local configurations or nodes’ attributes
on the evolution of empirically observed networks. Parameters of the model can be interpreted as
representing agents’ preferences for certain local configurations in their own personal networks.
Parameter estimates and standard errors are computed by artificially generating a stochastic dis-
tribution of networks. This is achieved by a stochastic simulation algorithm, which derives the
expected evolution of network ties from theoretically specified assumptions about agent preferences
and a decision-making mechanism. Computer simulations of the algorithm can then be performed
to generate macro-level artificial network configurations. Note that we followed the application of
SAOMs as ABMs suggested by Snijders and Steglich (2015) only partially as we did not fit the model
to any specific empirical data. Indeed, our model was theoretical, while referring to an idealtypic
empirical situation (Boero & Squazzoni, 2005).
At each iteration of the simulation algorithm, an agent i was randomly drawn from
a population of size n and had to decide whether to change one of its outgoing ties or not. To
do so, i first calculated the utility that would be obtained given each possible tie change, according
to an objective function:
fiðxÞ ¼
X
k
βksikðxÞ; (1)
where
P
k sik was a set of graph statistics calculated on i‘s personal network. Note that these statistics
represented local configurations of agents’ personal networks toward which they could have positive
or negative preferences of various magnitude, according to values of parameter coefficients, βk, e.g.,
a preference for reciprocated trust relations above unilateral trust.
Secondly, i selected one of the n possible subsequent states – including no change – through a multi-
nomial random experiment, in which each possible state had the following probability:
pðchange in xijÞ ¼
expðfiðnetwork after change in xijÞÞP
h expðfiðnetwork after change in xihÞÞ
: (2)
Following Snijders et al. (2013), we included a multiplex network X with three layers: Collaboration
(XðCÞ), Trust (XðTÞ) and Support expectations (XðSÞ). Algorithm 1 shows the main steps of the model
algorithm. At each iteration, randomly selected agent i could decide to change the state of one
randomly selected network layer. Each network layer was selected with fixed equal probability λ ¼ 13 .
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of the simulation algorithm
Input: Time t, number of iterations m, network X with nodes 2 f1; 2; 3; . . . ; ng and layers XðCÞ,
XðTÞ, XðSÞ, change probability of network layers λðCÞ, λðTÞ, λðSÞ.
1: Initialize t ¼ 0
2: while t<m do
3: Randomly select one node i
4: Randomly select one network layer XðrÞ
5: t  t þ 1
6: for all nodes ji do
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7: Set utility after change hij  fiðXðrÞÞ if XðrÞij is changed
8: end for
9: hii  fiðXðrÞÞ
10: Select one node j with probability πðjÞ ¼ expðhjÞP
k
expðhkÞ
11: if ji then
12: if XðrÞij ¼ 0 then
13: XðrÞij  1
14: else
15: XðrÞij  0
16: end if
17: end if
18: end while
In order to consider these mechanisms with realistic network dynamics, we parameterized the
model both with within-network (i.e., agent preferences for local configurations) and cross-network
processes (i.e., multiplexity) for each of the three network layers, i.e., Collaboration, Trust, and
Support expectations. This means that agents considered three different objective functions.
3.1. Collaboration
We modeled Collaboration as a directed network XðCÞ where xðCÞij ¼ 1 if i sent a request of
collaboration to j and 0 otherwise. If xðCÞij ¼ 1 and xðCÞji ¼ 1, i.e., a request of collaboration was
reciprocated within a dyad, we assumed that i and j had a collaboration tie. Here, we followed
Ferligoj, Kronegger, Mali, Snijders, and Doreian (2015) in modeling XðCÞ as a directed network.
The objective function for XðCÞ was as follows:
f ðCÞi ðxÞ ¼ βðCÞ0
X
j
xðCÞij þ βðCÞ1
X
j
xðCÞij x
ðCÞ
ji þ βðCÞ2
X
j
xðCÞij Rj
þ βðCÞ3
X
j
xðTÞij x
ðCÞ
ij
(3)
The first term of the sum (
P
j x
ðCÞ
ij , outdegree) represented agents’ baseline tendency of requesting
collaboration to other agents. The second term (
P
j x
ðCÞ
ij x
ðCÞ
ji , reciprocity) represented agents’ ten-
dency of accepting collaboration requests. The third term (
P
j x
ðCÞ
ij Rj, resource popularity) repre-
sented agents’ tendency to requesting collaboration to agents based on the receiver’s level of
resources, Rj. Finally, the last term represented agents’ tendency of collaborating with agents with
whom they already had a trust tie (
P
j x
ðTÞ
ij x
ðCÞ
ij , association with Trust).
3.2. Trust
We modeled Trust as a directed network XðTÞ where xij ¼ 1 if i trusts j and 0 otherwise. For XðTÞ, we
assumed the following objective function:
f ðTÞi ðxÞ ¼ βðTÞ0;0
X
j
xðTÞij þ βðTÞ0;1 ð
X
j
xðTÞij Þ2 þ βðTÞ1
X
j
xðTÞij x
ðTÞ
ji
þ βðTÞ2
X
j
X
h
xðTÞij x
ðTÞ
ih x
ðTÞ
jh þ βðTÞ3
X
j
xðCÞij x
ðTÞ
ij :
(4)
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The first term of the sum (
P
j x
ðTÞ
ij , outdegree) represented agents’ baseline tendency to trust others,
while the second term (ðPj xðTÞij Þ2, outdegree slope) modeled the utility change of an additional trust
tie change when the outdegree increased. The third term (
P
j x
ðTÞ
ij x
ðTÞ
ji , reciprocity) represented
agents’ tendency to reciprocate trust, while the fourth term (
P
j
P
h x
ðTÞ
ij x
ðTÞ
ih x
ðTÞ
jh , transitive triplets)
represented the tendency of i to trust j if both already trusted the same third agent, h, i.e., transitive
path closure. These four parameters represented agents’ within-network preferences. Finally, the last
term (
P
j x
ðCÞ
ij x
ðTÞ
ij , association with Collaboration) indicated agents’ tendency to trust other agents to
whom they had sent collaboration requests.
3.3. Support expectations
We modeled Support expectations as a directed network XðSÞ where xij ¼ 1 if i expected social
support from j and 0 otherwise. The objective function of XðSÞ was as follows:
f ðSÞi ðxÞ ¼ βðSÞ0;0
X
j
xðSÞij þ βðSÞ0;1ð
X
j
xðSÞij Þ2 þ βðSÞ1
X
j
xðSÞij x
ðSÞ
ji
þ βðSÞ2
X
j
X
h
xðSÞij x
ðSÞ
ih x
ðSÞ
jh þ βðSÞ3
X
j
xðTÞij x
ðSÞ
ij :
(5)
The first term of the sum (
P
j x
ðSÞ
ij , outdegree) represented agents’ baseline tendency to expect
support from others, while the second term (
P
j ðxðSÞij Þ2, outdegree slope) modeled the utility change
of an additional support expectation tie change when the outdegree increased. Similarly to Equation
4, the third and fourth terms represented agents’ tendency to respectively reciprocate expectations of
support (
P
j x
ðSÞ
ij x
ðSÞ
ji , reciprocity) and expect support from an agent j if both already expected support
from the same third agent, h (
P
j
P
h x
ðSÞ
ij x
ðSÞ
ih x
ðSÞ
jh , transitive triplets). Finally, last term (
P
j x
ðTÞ
ij x
ðSÞ
ij ,
association with Trust) implemented agents’ tendency to expect support from trusted agents.
4. Model specification and simulation design
Simulations were run on a population of n ¼ 20 agents, i.e., in a small-scale population. Note that
results from sensitivity analysis on n ¼ f50; 100g did not show any significant qualitative difference
(see Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix Section). We fixed network change rate parameters
throughout all our simulations equal for all three network layers, so that
λðCÞ ¼ λðTÞ ¼ λðSÞ ¼ 1
3
: (6)
We ran computer simulations by manipulating the distribution of resources and the correlated
neediness. This required to examine three different scenarios depending on different parameter
specifications.
4.1. Baseline
Table 1 shows the coefficient values of a Baseline scenario, following Equations 3, 4 and 5.
Concerning XðCÞ, we specified a negative outdegree parameter to indicate that requesting collabora-
tion was costly for agents as this involved managing cooperation and coordination with partners.
The cost of sending collaboration requests was balanced by a positive reciprocity parameter, which
considered the general benefit of receiving a collaboration opportunity. By assuming a negative
baseline tendency to create an additional tie, together with a positive tendency toward reciprocation,
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we modeled marginal diminishing returns of collaboration requests. In this way, a collaboration
request yielded a negative marginal impact on the sender’s utility, unless it reciprocated an incoming
request, or it was sent to either a high-resource or a trusted agent. This was to reflect the notion that
collaborations as such are costly to establish and increase utility only if they create an additional
form of benefit. In order to model agent preferences to target resourceful partners, we assumed
resource popularity as a positive tendency. Finally, by specifying a positive coefficient for the
association with Trust parameter, we assumed that agents preferred to request collaboration to
trusted agents.
Concerning XðTÞ, we assumed that agents had cognitive constraints while managing personal
networks in that trust ties yielded marginal diminishing returns. Following Flache and Stark (2009),
we set βðTÞ0;0 and β
ðTÞ
0;1 of Equation 4 with a positive and a negative value, respectively. This allowed us to
introduce marginal utility of any additional trust tie exceeding the marginal cost for agents with a low
outdegree. As outdegree increased, marginal costs grew so that the expected utility of any new tie was
below a certain low threshold. Following previous research on trust networks, we assumed that agents
tended to reciprocate trust (reciprocity) and that agents who trusted the same third-party tended to
trust each other (transitive triplets) (e.g. Bianchi et al., 2018; Lusher, Robins, Pattison, & Lomi, 2012;
Robins, Pattison, & Wang, 2009). Moreover, by assuming transitive closure of trust ties, together with
agents’ preference for sending collaboration requests to trusted agents (Association with Trust; see
above paragraph), we also aimed to model processes of transitive closure in XðCÞ without adding an ad
hoc parameter for it. Finally, we assumed that agents preferentially trusted agents to whom they had
sent a Collaboration request tie (association with Collaboration).
Concerning XðSÞ, we assumed that expecting support from different sources yielded marginal
diminishing returns, similarly to XðTÞ. Following Bianchi et al. (2018), we assumed that agents preferred
to reciprocate expectations of support (reciprocity), were inclined to closing paths of support expectation
ties (transitive triplets), and preferentially expected support from trusted agents (association with Trust).
Note that we explored a wider range of coefficient values to approximate previous empirical
findings by Bianchi et al. (2018), while trying to avoid problems of network degeneracy, which are
related to tie closure (Frank & Strauss, 1986). We reported sensitivity analysis results on alternative
coefficient values of outdegree slope, reciprocity, and transitive triplets in a Supplementary
Information document (SI).
In order to manipulate the distribution of resources, we varied agents’ Ri level of resources. In the
baseline scenario, we assumed that
Table 1. Model specification in the baseline scenario.
Parameter Coefficient value
Collaboration
Outdegree −4
Reciprocity 3
Resource popularity 3
Association with Trust 1
Trust
Outdegree 5
Outdegree slope −1
Reciprocity 1
Transitive triplets 0.5
Association with Collaboration 1
Support expectations
Outdegree 5
Outdegree slope −1
Reciprocity 1
Transitive triplets 0.5
Association with Trust 1
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Ri ¼ 0 "i:
This implied that agents’ preference to collaborate with more resourceful partners did not yield any
effect on network dynamics (see Equation 3 and Table 1).
4.2. Competition
We simulated a Competition scenario, in which we divided the population in two classes of equal
size, high-resource (H) and low-resource (L) agents. In this scenario, R was distributed among agents
as a 2-class attribute, as follows:
Ri ¼ 0 if i 2 L1 if i 2 H

Combined with agents’ preference for resourceful collaborators, this distribution allowed us to
model competition among agents for attracting the most resourceful collaboration partners.
4.3. Competition/neediness
Finally, we simulated a third scenario, defined Competition/neediness, where we assumed that agents
were heterogeneous in terms of neediness (N), which was negatively correlated to R, as follows.
Ni ¼ 0:5 if i 2 L0:5 if i 2 H

In this case, we assumed that Ni changed agents’ baseline tendency of expecting support from
different sources by redefining agents’ objective function for XðSÞ as follows:
f ðSÞi ðxÞ ¼ βðSÞ0;0
X
j
xðSÞij þ ðβðSÞ0;1 þ NiÞ
X
j
xðSÞij
 !2
þ βðSÞ1
X
j
xðSÞij x
ðSÞ
ji
þ βðSÞ2
X
j
X
h
xðSÞij x
ðSÞ
ih x
ðSÞ
jh þ βðSÞ3
X
j
xðTÞij x
ðSÞ
ij :
(7)
Therefore, the coefficient of the outdegree slope parameter changed according to the level of agents’
resources. More precisely, the marginal returns of ties related to expectations of support diminished
faster for H-agents than for L-agents, as follows:
βðSÞð0;1Þi ¼
0:5 if i 2 L
1:5 if i 2 H

Table 2 summarizes our three simulation scenarios, which depended on the manipulation of the
distribution of R and N.
Table 2. Simulation design.
Scenario Distribution of R Distribution of N
Baseline equal –
Competition heterogeneous –
Competition/Neediness heterogeneous heterogeneous
THE JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 9
4.4. Simulation design
We simulated each scenario for 1,000 realizations. For each realization, we ran the simulation
algorithm for 20,000 iterations in order to achieve robust outcome measures at approximate
equilibrium levels for all scenarios. Agents were initialized in empty networks.1
We analyzed simulation outcomes by obtaining non-directed networks of Mutual support expec-
tations (XðMSÞ), where xij ¼ 1 if both i and j had Support expectation ties to each other, while xij ¼ 0
otherwise. We calculated the average degree of XðMSÞ to test our hypothesis on connectivity (see
Propositions 1a and 1b in Section 2). In order to measure segregation, we calculated gross segregation
values, as proposed by Moody (2001). The index considers the probability that network ties occur
between nodes with the same value of a certain attribute more likely than between nodes with
dissimilar values. In this case, A denoted the number of Mutual support expectation ties between
agents with the same level of resources, while C was the number of pairs of agents with the same
level of resources without these ties. This meant that A=C measured the odds that i and j had
a Mutual support expectation tie, provided that i and j had a similar level of resources. Similarly, B=D
indicated the odds of a Mutual support expectation tie between i and j if they had different levels of
resources, where B was the number of ties between agents of different levels of resources, and D was
the number of pairs of agents having different levels of resources without any tie. We defined the
gross segregation index as an odds ratio and calculated it as follows:
s ¼ AD
BC
:
5. Results
Table 3 shows mean results on average degree and gross segregation of the Mutual support
expectation network in the three simulation scenarios, while Figure 1 shows distributions.
Outcome measures were averaged over 1,000 realizations for each scenario, by calculating outcome
statistics at approximating equilibrium after 20,000 iterations. For the sake of readability, we log-
transformed distributions of gross segregation of each scenario.2
Simulation results show that the average connectivity of the Mutual support expectation network
decreased in the Competition scenario compared to the baseline, while resource-driven segregation
increased. These results corroborate our propositions (see Propositions 1a and 1b in Section 2).
While the effect on segregation was relatively strong, that on connectivity was considerably weak.
This was because H-agents increased their popularity, so receiving more ties, whereas L-agents were
less popular, so receiving less ties. Therefore, overall degree did not change significantly.
We then examined degree dynamics of each network layer in more detail. Figure 2 shows the
mean evolution of the average outdegree of XðCÞ, XðTÞ, and XðSÞ in each scenario, while Figure 3
Table 3. Average degree and gross segregation (log-transformed) of Mutual sup-
port expectations networks in simulation scenarios. Mean values were averaged
over 1,000 realizations, standard deviation are reported in parentheses.
Outcome
Scenario Average degree Gross segregation
Baseline 1.45 (0.24) −0.02 (0.63)
Competition 1.38 (0.24) 0.40 (0.66)
Competition/neediness 2.05 (0.47) 0.98 (0.80)
1We performed robustness tests by initializing the model with XðCÞ being an Erdös-Renyi random network with density
valuesd ¼ ½0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5. We did not observe any relevant qualitative differences of simulation results.
2In order to calculate average values of gross segregation we did not consider those simulation outcomes with s ¼ þ1 values,
which occurred in those cases where BC ¼ 0 becauseB ¼ 0, i.e. there were no between-group Mutual support expectation ties.
The amount of such cases accounted for 0.012% of the simulation realizations in the worst case (Competition/neediness scenario).
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shows the average outdegree of XðCÞ and XðSÞ between and within resource classes across scenarios.
By comparing the first and second panels in Figure 2, it is possible to observe that competition with
unequal resource distribution boosted the number of collaboration requests, while the average
number of trust and support expectation ties remained about the same.
The top left panel in Figure 3 shows a disproportionately higher amount of collaboration requests
in the Competition scenario between H-agents. This was due to agents’ preference of targeting
resourceful agents for collaboration combined with the positive tendency of reciprocating collabora-
tion requests. On the one hand, the assumed association between network layers caused Trust ties to
develop disproportionately between H-agents, which eventually generated a higher concentration of
Support expectation ties within the H class (see top right panel in Figure 3). On the other hand,
building collaboration ties was difficult for L-agents, because their collaboration requests to H-agents
Figure 1. Boxplots of average degree and gross segregation across simulation scenarios (1,000 realizations each). Bold horizontal
lines indicate median values, red dots indicate mean values.
Figure 2. Simulated dynamics of average outdegree of Collaboration, Trust, and Support expectations networks. (Values averaged
over 100 replications).
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were less likely to be reciprocated, while their probability of receiving collaboration requests was low
as well. This means that L-agents were out of the core of the emerging Collaboration network. This
implied that they had less opportunities to build Mutual expectation support ties. Furthermore, the
top right panel in Figure 3 shows that L-agents tended to expect less support from other in-group
agents, while sending their Support expectation ties to H-agents, who reciprocated only occasionally.
Therefore, under a competition regime with unequal resource distribution, agents’ preferences of
building Trust and Support expectation ties with collaboration partners generated a core-periphery
Mutual support expectation network, with L-agents confined to peripheral network regions (see
Figure 4 for illustrative examples). This result reflects the core-periphery networks generated by
Flache & Hegselmann’s models of support exchange among unequal actors (1999b), unless it was
assumed that agents were driven by partially altruistic preferences (1999a).
The picture changed when we assumed neediness heterogeneity and a negative correlation of
neediness with resources. Table 3 shows that our theoretical expectations (see Proposition 2 in
Section 2) consistently follow from the dynamics generated by the behavioral assumptions of our
model. Results showed that overall connectivity increased consistently in the Competition/neediness
scenario, with some simulations generating Mutual support expectation networks with relatively highly
connected networks. It is interesting to note that the increase in connectivity was not accompanied by
higher integration. In fact, mean gross segregation significantly increased, with a slightly right-skewed
distribution (see Figure 1b). This was due to the fact that we assumed a steeper marginal decrease of H-
agents’ tendency to expect support from other agents than for L-agents. This resulted in L-agents
directing support expectations at a larger number of other agents than H-agents did. These expectations
were primarily reciprocated by other L-agents, which resulted in the emergence of a more dense network
ofMutual support expectations among L-agents. Figure 3 (bottom right panel) shows that L-agents had
Figure 3. Simulated dynamics of average outdegree of Collaboration and Support expectations within and between resource
classes across scenarios. (Values are averaged over 100 replications).
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on average a higher outdegree of Support expectations thanH-agents, especially directed toward other L-
agents. This changed the peripheral position which L-agents occupied in the Competition scenario in the
Support expectation network into a highly connected position.3 This further strengthened the segrega-
tion process already observed in the Competition scenario (see bottom right panel in Figure 4).
6. Discussion and conclusions
Our computational findings from a stochastic ABM supported our propositions on the effect of resource
heterogeneity and competition on the link between collaboration and solidarity. We found that resource
heterogeneity has a double-edged effect on the formation of social support relations (Flache &
Hegselmann, 1999a, 1999b). On the one hand, competition generates slightly less connected and highly
Figure 4. Instances of simulated Mutual support expectation networks across scenarios. Node colors represent resource classes. Green:
L-agents; red: H-agents.. In the Printed version Black: L-agents; white: H-agents
3By setting Transitive triplets parameter of XðSÞ to 0, we did not obtain qualitatively different results. This suggests that the
observed dynamics could not be attributed to transitive closure (see SI for more information).
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segregated networks of support expectations. This is because if professionals compete for collaboration,
preference for high-resource partners and a positive tendency toward reciprocation push low-resource
individuals to peripheral network positions. Furthermore, if professionals develop trust preferentially
toward collaboration partners, low-resource individuals cannot form an amount of trust ties equal to
high-resource ones. Considering that support expectations are preferentially directed toward trusted
others (Bianchi et al., 2018; Molm et al., 2009), low-resource individuals are marginalized in peripheral
regions of support expectation networks. While the overall generation of support expectations is only
slightly decreased by competition for collaboration, a considerable level of segregation is expected. On
the other hand, while heterogeneity in neediness can in principle counteract the decrease in connectivity,
given that support expectations are preferably reciprocated by others having similar resources, resource-
ful individuals tend to cluster in collaboration-based relationships while low-resource individuals
segregate among each other. Then, network segregation follows resource distribution triggered by
reciprocity tendencies.
Our findings have important implications for sociological theory and applied organizational
research. First, our study allows to define more precisely constraints and context-dependent condi-
tions that can lead to the emergence of solidarity from economic exchange (Bianchi et al., 2018;
Kuwabara, 2011). Our results point to the possibility that competitive contexts and resource inequal-
ity could still generate relatively dense social support networks, although highly segregated. This is
also pivotal to understand certain negative aspects of solidarity, as solidary behavior toward in-group
members also leads to the exclusion of out-group individuals from potential benefits (Komter, 2001).
Second, while our results are in line with studies indicating possible detrimental effects of network
centralization on group-level cooperation (Molm, 1994) and performance (Mora-Cantallops & Sicilia,
2019), our model suggests that individual interests in building support ties can counter-balance certain
dysfunctional effects of competition in organizational settings. However, if skills and competencies are
distributed unequally in professional networks or complex organizations, competition and multiplexity
effects between trust and support could trigger network segregation. This is because resourceful
individuals would rarely reciprocate support expectations of low-resource individuals (Flache &
Hegselmann, 1999b). This has relevant implications for designing organizational settings. While the
lack of social support by resourceful partners could be detrimental for learning, social approval and
professional confidence of low-resource professionals, a segregated support network could yield unde-
sired effects also in organizational settings by backfiring on collaboration relations (Mora-Cantallops &
Sicilia, 2019; Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001).
While theoretically highlighting intriguing complexities in the interplay of collaboration, trust and
support expectations in economic exchange and organizations, our study also has some limitations,
which make any generalization problematic and call for empirical tests. While we added behavioral
heterogeneity to network modeling (Bojanowski & Buskens, 2011; Bravo, Squazzoni, & Boero, 2012;
Xiong, Payne, & Kinsella, 2018) and a dynamic picture to network effects, which is difficult in behavioral
research (Takács, Bravo, & Squazzoni, 2018), our findings require extensions to understand larger-scale
populations. Here, we aimed to extend previous empirical findings (Bianchi et al., 2018) by developing
well-controled theoretical explorations that looked at richer behavioral assumptions. However, the
capacity of a model to examine complex multiplex network interdependencies must be completed by
considering the dynamic interplay of behavioral and structural factors. Finally, a more explicit attention
to status, recognition and signals, as well as to the strategic management of positive and negative ties,
would enrich our understanding of the link between competition and solidarity in professional colla-
borations (Grow, Flache, & Wittek, 2015; Rubineau, Lim, & Neblo, 2019).
In conclusion, despite these limitations, our study testifies to the fruitfulness of ABM for theory
development, in particular to explore the consequences of artificial, experimental manipulations on
social network dynamics (Raub, Buskens, & van Assen, 2011; Snijders & Steglich, 2015; Stadtfeld,
2018; see also examples by Anjos & Reagans, 2013; Stadtfeld et al., 2020). By manipulating variations
of environmental configurations, computer simulation helps to observe aggregate consequences of
micro-level processes while controlling for factors that empirical research cannot always fully isolate.
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While our study was only indirectly informed by previous empirical research (Bianchi et al., 2018),
we hope that it can inspire future empirical tests and stimulate further theoretical extensions (Boero
& Squazzoni, 2005; Flache et al., 2017) so that we can cross-fertilize case-based empirical network
studies and social network theoretical work.
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Appendix: Sensitivity analysis
Figure A1. Average degree of Mutual support expectations across scenarios for n ¼ 20, 50, and 100. (Mean values over 1,000
realizations).
Figure A2. Gross segregation (log) of Mutual support expectations across scenarios for n ¼ 20, 50, and 100. (Mean values over
1,000 realizations).
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